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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—INDECENT EXPOSURE 
Summary 
 Appeal from order of dismissal of indecent exposure charges, after the district court judge 
concluded the state indecent exposure statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  
Disposition/Outcome  
 A unanimous Court reversed and remanded because the statute is neither 
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.  
Factual and Procedural History 
 Marty Castaneda (“Castaneda”), was arrested for intentionally and repeatedly exposing 
his genitals and buttocks while standing on a public sidewalk in front of the county jail in Las 
Vegas. The State charged Castaneda with indecent exposure under NRS 201.220.  Castaneda did 
not deny the allegations, but rather challenged the constitutionality of the statute.  The district 
court dismissed the charges, agreeing with Castaneda‟s claims.  The State appealed. 
Discussion 
Standard of Review 
 The Court reviews questions of a statute‟s constitutionality de novo.  Statutes are 
presumed constitutional and the party challenging a statute has “the burden of making a „clear 
showing of invalidity.‟”2  Further, the Court attempts to construe a statute so as to avoid 
constitutional infirmity.
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Vagueness 
 A criminal statute may be invalidated for vagueness for one of two independent reasons:
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(1) if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited;” or (2) 
if it “is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”5  
Constitutional vagueness may be defeated when courts construe the statute in light of “the 
common law definitions of the related term or offense.”6 
 Applying the vagueness standard, the Court held that the indecent exposure statute must 
be read so as to incorporate the common law understanding of the offense, as required under 
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NRS 193.050.
7
  The challenged statute states:  “A person who makes any open and indecent or 
obscene exposure of his or her person…is guilty” of a gross misdemeanor for the first offense or 
a category D felony for any subsequent offense.
8
  The Court rejected Castaneda‟s argument that 
the euphemistic use of “person” renders the statute vague.  The Court relied on two District of 
Columbia cases, as the District‟s statute resembles Nevada‟s.   
In Duvallon v. District of Columbia, the court stated that when a statute is ill-defined the 
common law definition is controlling.
9
  After canvassing the English common law, the court 
concluded indecent exposure was limited to exposure of genitals, and thus mere exposure of the 
defendant‟s buttocks was insufficient to constitute indecent exposure.10  In Parnigoni v. District 
of Columbia, the defendant asserted a vagueness challenge after being charged for removing his 
clothes to play nude Ping-Pong with the host‟s boy.11  The court held that Parnigoni could not 
assert lack of notice given the court‟s holding in Duvallon, which defined indecent exposure to 
incorporate the common law offense.
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 Here, the Court concluded that Castaneda‟s had fair notice that the statute incorporates 
the common law definition of indecent exposure because the Court previously held in Young v. 
Statethat “indecent exposure of one‟s genitals was punishable at common law.”13  The Court also 
noted that numerous other jurisdictions and authorities prohibit the intentional exposure of one‟s 
“person” or “private parts.”   
 Ultimately, the Court held that a statute‟s reliance on “case- and common-law definitions 
to establish the conduct it forbids…does not render it impermissibly vague.”  The Court finally 
stated that although some discretion is required to determine when genital exposure is open and 
indecent or obscene, the discretion is not enough to sustain a vagueness challenge. 
Overbreadth 
 The Court dismissed Castaneda‟s overbreadth challenge because the Court limited the 
statute‟s scope to the common law prohibition against open and indecent or obscene exposure of 
one‟s genitals or anus, and thus the statute does not catch a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected expressive conduct within its sweep.
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Conclusion 
 Nevada‟s indecent exposure statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because 
it incorporates the offense‟s common law definition, limiting the meaning to open and indecent 
or obscene exposure of one‟s genitals or anus. 
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